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 Why Only Gideon?: Martinez v. Ryan and the 
“Equitable” Right to Counsel in Habeas 
Corpus 
Emily Garcia Uhrig* 
ABSTRACT 
In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Martinez v. Ryan, recognized for 
the first time a limited right to assistance of counsel in postconviction pro-
ceedings.  Unexpectedly, the Court traced this right to equitable, rather than 
constitutional, authority.  Moreover, the right extends only to initial-review 
postconviction proceedings, i.e., proceedings that offer the first meaningful 
opportunity for an inmate to raise the claim at issue.  Likewise, the right ex-
tends only to substantial claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 
The Court’s depiction of this limited right to postconviction counsel as 
“equitable” avoided the pitfalls that would have been posed by the recogni-
tion of a constitutional right to counsel.  Specifically, as an equitable right, 
states are not required to provide affirmative assistance of postconviction 
counsel.  Rather, a state may simply implement the right at the back end of 
postconviction proceedings by waiving any default of a substantial trial inef-
fective assistance of counsel that arises as a result of the petitioner’s pro se 
status or postconviction counsel error.  Additionally, the Court sidestepped 
the infinite-continuum-of-habeas dilemma that recognition of a constitutional 
right would present: if an inmate has a constitutional right to counsel in an 
initial-review collateral proceeding, he or she will also be entitled to effective 
assistance of counsel.  And where constitutionally guaranteed postconviction 
counsel is constitutionally ineffective, the inmate must have a remedy – i.e., a 
second round of postconviction proceedings – to cure the prejudice.  The 
same scenario plays out in each subsequent round of postconviction proceed-
ings.  The equitable right to counsel carries with it no such baggage.  In 
short, the equitable right to counsel, at least on its face, is presented as the 
constitutional right’s more flexible and much less complicated cousin. 
This Article argues, however, that by limiting the relief provided by the 
equitable right to counsel only to substantial ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel, the Court drew a line that is unsustainable.  The elevation in post-
conviction enforcement of claims derived from Gideon v. Wainwright over all 
other substantial claims of constitutional error finds no support in the history 
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and function of the Great Writ.  Rather, if equity requires a remedy where 
postconviction counsel fails to raise a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel claim and thus defaults the claim in federal court, it also de-
mands relief where counsel fails to present any other substantial constitu-
tional violation that compromises the fundamental fairness or the accuracy of 
the criminal process. 
INTRODUCTION 
In October 2011, in Martinez v. Ryan,1 the U.S. Supreme Court granted 
certiorari on one of the most significant unresolved issues in right-to-counsel 
jurisprudence: whether an inmate has a constitutional right to assistance of 
counsel in postconviction proceedings for claims for which postconviction 
litigation offers the first meaningful forum for judicial review.  But rather 
than resolve the issue, the Court, in a 7-2 ruling, circumvented it entirely by 
announcing for the first time a more limited, “equitable” right to postconvic-
tion counsel.2  By design, this equitable right extends only to substantial 
claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, rather than the universe of 
claims cognizable in postconviction proceedings.  Despite the storied role of 
equity in habeas corpus, the Court’s ruling in Martinez was both astonishing 
and unprecedented.  Indeed, in a strongly worded dissent, Justice Scalia ques-
tioned the majority’s attempt at crafting a limited “equitable” right to post-
conviction counsel for ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims only.3  He 
argued, with little explication, that there is no defensible basis for limiting 
this newly minted right to counsel to ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
claims.4  As with its constitutional counsel, if equity demands assistance of 
counsel for ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, it likewise demands 
such assistance for other constitutional claims cognizable in federal habeas.  
As such, despite the majority’s assertion to the contrary, Justice Scalia de-
clared that, in the end, there is no difference between the “equitable” right 
and the long sought after constitutional right to postconviction counsel.5  This 
Article responds to Justice Scalia’s provocative critique of the Court’s deci-
sion in Martinez and evaluates whether this equitable right to counsel should 
extend to other constitutional claims cognizable in federal habeas, at least in 
the context of procedural default doctrine. 
In a prior article, A Case for a Constitutional Right to Counsel in Habe-
as Corpus,6 I argued that the due process and equal protection interests that 
underpin the well-established right to counsel on direct appeal also warrant 
 
 1. 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012). 
 2. Id. at 1318–20. 
 3. Id. at 1321. 
 4. Id. at 1326–27. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Emily Garcia Uhrig, A Case for a Constitutional Right to Counsel in Habeas 
Corpus, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 541, 544 (2009). 
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recognition of a constitutional right to counsel in postconviction proceedings 
that provide the first opportunity to litigate the claim at issue.7  The Supreme 
Court refers to these proceedings as “initial-review collateral proceedings.”8  
Typically at issue in such proceedings are claims that derive from facts out-
side the scope of the trial record, such as allegations of ineffective assistance 
of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct.  The most difficult obstacle to 
recognition of a constitutional right to counsel in initial-review collateral 
proceedings is the prospect of an infinite continuum of postconviction pro-
ceedings.  Specifically, if an inmate has a constitutional right to counsel in an 
initial-review collateral proceeding,9 he will also be entitled to effective assis-
tance of counsel.  And where constitutionally-guaranteed postconviction 
counsel is constitutionally ineffective, the inmate must have a remedy – i.e., a 
second round of postconviction proceedings – to cure the prejudice.  The 
same scenario then applies to each subsequent round of postconviction pro-
ceedings.  In A Case for a Constitutional Right to Counsel in Habeas Corpus, 
I argued that the remote potential of such a scenario does not justify extin-
guishing an otherwise compelling constitutional right.10 
In Martinez v. Ryan, the U.S. Supreme Court resisted recognition of a 
constitutional right to counsel in initial-review postconviction proceedings.11  
Instead, the Court recognized a limited “equitable” right to counsel in post-
conviction proceedings.12  In so doing, the Court was able to conclude that 
ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel may provide “cause” to ex-
cuse the procedural default of certain claims resulting from attorney error or 
lack of counsel altogether.13  The Court limited its holding to substantial, 
otherwise-defaulted claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for which 
 
 7. The second article argues for a right to counsel that is procedural, rather than 
substantive, in nature.  Emily Garcia Uhrig, The Sacrifice of Unarmed Prisoners to 
Gladiators: The Post-AEDPA Access-to-the-Courts Demand for a Constitutional 
Right to Counsel in Federal Habeas Corpus, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1219, 1220 
(2012).  Such right derives from the complexity of the procedural requirements erect-
ed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), and the often insurmountable task of the indigent 
inmate’s attempt to navigate this complexity with sufficient success to obtain merits 
review of a habeas petition.  Id.  The right itself finds constitutional authority in the 
access-to-the-courts doctrine.  Id. at 1219. 
 8. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315. 
 9. I refer throughout this Article to petitioners as “he” for ease of reference only 
because the vast majority of individuals serving prison time in the United States are 
men.  See William J. Sabol et al., Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin: Prisoners in 
2006, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 3–4 (Dec. 2007), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p06.pdf 
(stating that the number of men in prison in 2006 was 1,458,363; the number of wom-
en was 112,498). 
 10. Uhrig, supra note 6, at 545. 
 11. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315. 
 12. Id. at 1318. 
 13. Id.  The Court remanded the case for further consideration in light of its 
holding.  Id. at 1312. 
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postconviction proceedings provide the first forum for review.14  On its face, 
the decision leaves without remedy all other claims defaulted by postconvic-
tion attorney error, e.g., those involving allegations of ineffective assistance 
of counsel on direct appeal or Brady v. Maryland violations. 
In many respects, what the Court did in Martinez was quite ingenious.  
If recognized, a constitutional right to counsel in initial-review postconviction 
proceedings would have supplied the requisite cause to excuse a procedural 
default caused by postconviction counsel’s ineffectiveness, as defined by 
Strickland v. Washington.15  But as discussed, such a right would also gener-
ate a freestanding right to effective assistance of counsel, which, if denied, 
would require another round of postconviction process to remedy.  But by 
starting at the back end analytically, i.e., simply declaring on equitable 
grounds that the identical ineffectiveness – as defined by constitutional juris-
prudence no less – provides “cause” to excuse a default, the Court leap-
frogged over finding the constitutional right.  In so doing, the Court avoided 
the infinite-continuum-of-habeas dilemma.  This is particularly stunning doc-
trinally because, in recognizing the equitable right to counsel for initial-
review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the Court relied entirely on 
the equitable principles that undergird the constitutional right to counsel.  
Hence, Justice Scalia observed in dissent that there is no meaningful distinc-
tion between the substance of this newly recognized equitable right to counsel 
and a constitutional one.16 
What remains difficult to reconcile with the role and jurisprudence of 
the writ of habeas corpus – the Great Writ of Liberty – is the Court’s une-
quivocal limitation of its decision to cases in which the claim sought to be 
raised in postconviction review is ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  In 
dissent, Justice Scalia dismisses this limitation as unsustainable, arguing that 
once accepted, the Court’s reasoning must necessarily extend to all claims for 
which postconviction proceedings provide the first forum for review.17  
Though Justice Scalia does not fully articulate his position, I agree that the 
majority’s limitation is analytically vulnerable.  Inevitably, if equity demands 
a remedy where postconviction counsel fails to raise a Sixth Amendment 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim and thus defaults the claim in 
federal court, it should likewise demand a remedy where, for example, coun-
sel fails to argue a substantial Brady v. Maryland claim,18 despite learning 
postconviction that the prosecutor withheld material exculpatory evidence 
from the defense. 
But to achieve such parity in the availability of relief under the writ of 
habeas corpus requires assessment of both the role of the writ in common law 
and the stature and force of a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to 
 
 14. See id. at 1309. 
 15. 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984). 
 16. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1321. 
 17. Id. 
 18. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
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counsel in the first instance.  This Article is the first to offer such an assess-
ment19 and is structured as follows: Part I briefly reviews the relevant right to 
counsel jurisprudence prior to Martinez.  Part II discusses in detail the Mar-
tinez opinion, and in particular, its articulation of an “equitable” right to 
counsel and attempt to limit application of that right to substantial ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims.  Part III assesses whether, as Justice Scalia ar-
gues in dissent, Martinez’s holding inevitably compels recognition of such an 
equitable right for claims other than ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  
Within this Part, I examine first, the nature and underpinnings of Gideon v. 
Wainwright’s special status within the pantheon of criminal procedure rights 
and second, the historical and modern role of the Great Writ, both with re-
spect to Gideon, as well as other claims of constitutional error.  Lastly, I ex-
amine whether the unique status of Gideon and its progeny justifies Mar-
tinez’s special dispensation of a remedy in federal habeas to allow considera-
tion of otherwise-defaulted allegations of ineffective assistance of trial coun-
sel. 
Ultimately, I argue that the Martinez majority is correct in concluding 
that ineffective assistance of counsel claims indeed occupy a unique role in 
habeas corpus.  But the elevation in federal habeas proceedings of ineffective 
assistance above other constitutional violations, such as Brady v. Maryland or 
Batson claims, is unsustainable.  The Great Writ does not recognize a hierar-
chy in constitutional violations worthy of vindication.  Thus, the Court’s nar-
row holding in Martinez should extend to include all cases in which ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel during initial-review postconviction proceedings 
causes the procedural default of a substantial claim of constitutional error. 
I.  RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN POSTCONVICTION PROCEEDINGS 
It is axiomatic that an individual who stands accused of a felony or of 
any criminal offense that involves the potential loss of physical liberty has a 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to assistance of counsel at trial.20  The 
 
 19. Cf. Justin F. Marceau, Gideon’s Shadow, 122 YALE L.J. 2482 (2013) (noting 
the possibility of Martinez’s rationale applying “with equal force to claims such as 
[those arising under Brady, 373 U.S. 83] or juror misconduct that could not be raised 
on direct appeal”); Mary Dewey, Martinez v. Ryan: A Shift Toward Broadening Ac-
cess to Federal Habeas Corpus, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 269 (2012) (noting the possibil-
ity of Martinez’s rationale applying to Brady claims). 
 20. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963) (recognizing the Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel in felony cases); Scott v. Illinois, 440 
U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979) (holding, five-four, the right to counsel in criminal cases 
applies only if the defendant faces some period of incarceration); Nichols v. United 
States, 511 U.S. 738, 743 n.9 (1994) (citation omitted) (noting in dicta that right to 
counsel attaches in felony cases regardless of potential incarceration); Alabama v. 
Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 674 (2002) (qualifying Scott to hold, five-four, that the right to 
counsel applies in misdemeanor cases even where the court suspends a sentence of 
incarceration and instead imposes probation). 
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right to counsel at trial is triggered in the first instance by initiation of adver-
sarial proceedings against the defendant.21  Trial, moreover, is interpreted 
broadly to include all “critical stages of the proceeding,”22 that is, “[W]here 
counsel’s absence might derogate from the accused’s right to a fair trial.”23  
The Court has deemed the right to counsel essential to safeguarding all of a 
criminal defendant’s legal rights and indeed, the right to a fair trial itself.24  
Hence, in assessing whether the right to counsel attaches to a particular stage 
of the criminal process, the Court evaluates the nexus between that stage and 
the ultimate adjudication of guilt at trial.25  In summary, the Court will: 
scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the accused to determine 
whether the presence of his counsel is necessary to preserve the de-
fendant’s basic right to a fair trial as affected by his right meaningfully 
to cross-examine the witnesses against him and to have effective assis-
tance of counsel at the trial itself.26 
In doing so, the Court will “analyze whether potential substantial preju-
dice to defendant’s rights inheres in the particular confrontation and the abil-
ity of counsel to help avoid that prejudice.”27  Hence, the Court has held the 
right to counsel attaches to a post-indictment lineup,28 a preliminary hearing29 
 
 21. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 192–93 (1984) (finding no right to 
counsel during administrative detention in prison before indictment for homicide 
unrelated to current offense of incarceration); cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 
494 (1966) (holding that the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination includes 
a right to counsel at pretrial custodial interrogation). 
 22. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224–25 (1967); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 
514; Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488 (1964); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 
52, 54 (1961); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 326 (1959). 
 23. Wade, 388 U.S. at 226–27. 
 24. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343–44 (noting that the “noble ideal” of “fair trials 
before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law . . . 
cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without 
a lawyer to assist him”). 
 25. Wade, 388 U.S. at 226–27. 
 26. Id. at 227. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 235–37; cf. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973) (explaining 
that Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not require assistance of counsel at post-
indictment showing of photospread containing defendant’s picture to eyewitness); 
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 267 (1967) (explaining that pre-indictment taking 
of handwriting exemplars from defendant is not a critical stage of criminal proceed-
ings at which right to counsel at trial attaches). 
 29. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 8–10 (1970) (holding that Alabama 
preliminary hearing – the sole purpose of which was to determine whether there was 
evidence sufficient to present case to grand jury – was critical stage of state’s criminal 
process at which right to counsel attached); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 
(1963) (per curiam) (explaining that regardless of normal function of preliminary 
hearing under Maryland law, hearing was critical stage of proceeding to which right 
6
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or arraignment where certain rights are at stake,30 and unconditionally, at 
sentencing.31 
Similarly, an individual convicted of a felony or crime involving a po-
tential loss of liberty has a right to counsel on direct appeal that derives from 
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.32  The difference, constitutionally, results from the Court’s 
recognition that the right to appeal a criminal conviction is purely a creature 
of statute, rather than a constitutional imperative.33  Once a state decides to 
provide a right of appeal, however, the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit doing so in a man-
ner that discriminates against the indigent.34  In light of the essential role 
counsel plays in litigating an effective appeal, “[W]here the merits of the one 
and only appeal an indigent has as of right are decided without benefit of 
counsel, . . . an unconstitutional line has been drawn between rich and 
poor.”35  In Penson v. Ohio, the Court observed that both trial and appellate 
stages of the prosecution, “although perhaps involving unique legal skills, 
require careful advocacy to ensure that rights are not foregone and that sub-
stantial legal and factual arguments are not inadvertently passed over.”36 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that these constitutional guaran-
tees require effective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal.37  So 
where counsel’s representation is deficient, as objectively assessed, and a 
petitioner suffers prejudice as a result, the petitioner is entitled to a remedy 
for violation of his constitutional right.38  But when an individual is denied 
counsel altogether at trial or on direct appeal, trial “counsel entirely fails to 
 
to counsel attached where defendant entered guilty plea and such plea was admitted 
against him at later trial). 
 30. Coleman, 399 U.S. at 7 (citing Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 
(1961)). 
 31. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 
128, 134–37 (1967); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 608–11 (1967); see also Es-
telle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 469–71 (1981) (holding that prosecution’s use of psychi-
atric evidence, obtained from defendant without notice to defense counsel, at sentenc-
ing in capital murder trial to show future dangerousness violated defendant’s Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel at critical stage of the proceeding); 
Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 738–41 (1948). 
 32. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
 33. Martinez v. Court of Appeals of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 159–60 (2000); Griffin, 
351 U.S. at 18; McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 688 (1894). 
 34. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18–19. 
 35. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963). 
 36. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84–85 (1988). 
 37. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (defining Sixth 
Amendment ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim); United States v. Cronic, 
466 U.S. 648 (1984) (finding right to effective assistance of counsel at trial); Evitts v. 
Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985) (finding right to effective assistance of counsel on 
first appeal of right). 
 38. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). 
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subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing,” or trial 
counsel functions under circumstances making competent representation im-
plausible, prejudice is presumed “without inquiry into counsel’s actual per-
formance at trial.”39 
Beyond direct appeal, the Court thus far has resisted recognizing a con-
stitutional right to counsel.  In particular, in Ross v. Moffitt, the Court held 
that appellants seeking discretionary review from a state supreme court on 
direct appeal do not have a right to counsel.40  Rather, in seeking discretion-
ary review, a pro se litigant can simply parrot the work-product of court-
appointed counsel on the first appeal.41  Likewise, in postconviction proceed-
ings, the Court has declined to recognize a constitutional right to counsel, at 
least insofar as where the petitioner seeks to raise claims that were raised on 
direct appeal, when petitioner enjoyed a right to counsel identifying and 
framing the claims.42  The rationale is the same as in discretionary review: a 
petitioner who has had the assistance of counsel on direct appeal in litigating 
a particular claim can simply import his attorney’s work-product into a post-
conviction petition without undue difficulty.43  Whether the right to counsel 
applies to claims for which postconviction proceedings provide the first fo-
rum for judicial review – and hence, petitioner has never had the benefit of 
competent legal assistance in preparing and presenting the claim44 – remains 
an open question.45 
Failure to recognize a constitutional right to counsel in postconviction 
proceedings has profound consequences in terms of the availability and effi-
cacy of postconviction proceedings for indigent petitioners.46  Postconviction 
practice mimics the pre-Gideon world of state prosecutions in which indigent 
litigants must go it alone in seeking relief from final convictions.47  Moreo-
ver, where postconviction counsel’s error – or lack of postconviction counsel 
altogether – causes a petitioner to fail to comply with the myriad procedural 
strictures of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(“AEDPA”), the remedy available under Strickland, Cronic, and Evitts, 
 
 39. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659–62. 
 40. 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974). 
 41. Id. at 614–16. 
 42. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 559 (1987); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 
U.S. 1, 11–12 (1989); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991). 
 43. Finley, 481 U.S. at 557. 
 44. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i) (2012). 
 45. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755; Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 
(2012). 
 46. See Uhrig, supra note 6; Uhrig, supra note 7. 
 47. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001) (finding state conviction be-
comes “final” when U.S. Supreme Court denies certiorari or time for seeking such 
review expires). 
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which restores the defendant to the position in which he would have been 
absent counsel’s error, is inapplicable.48 
The Supreme Court has devoted particular attention to the issue in the 
context of procedural default doctrine, most recently, with the Martinez v. 
Ryan decision.  Modern procedural default doctrine provides that, where state 
courts deny a substantive postconviction claim on the ground that the peti-
tioner failed to comply with a state procedural rule that is both independent of 
federal law49 and adequate (i.e., consistently applied by state courts), federal 
courts, too, will deem the claim procedurally defaulted and hence, barred 
from review.50 
Procedural default emphasizes principles of federalism.51  The doctrine 
“recognize[s] the important interest in finality served by state procedural 
rules, and the significant harm to the States that results from the failure of 
federal courts to respect them.”52 
To escape the death knell of procedural default, a petitioner must 
demonstrate “cause” for the default and show that he will suffer “prejudice” 
as a result.53  “Cause” must be an objective factor external to the defense and 
thus beyond petitioner’s control, which prevented compliance with the proce-
dural rule.54  “Prejudice” in turn requires more than the “possibility of preju-
dice,”55 in that counsel’s error must have “worked to [petitioner’s] actual and 
substantial disadvantage.”56  The petitioner may also find relief from the de-
fault if he can show that failure to consider the claims will result in a “funda-
mental miscarriage of justice.”57  A fundamental miscarriage of justice arises 
when a petitioner can show “actual innocence,” i.e., that the constitutional 
error “has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually inno-
 
 48. Cf. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2564 (2010) (finding extraordinary 
ineffective assistance of counsel may be a basis for equitable tolling of AEDPA’s 
statute of limitations); Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 927–28 (2011) (finding 
counsel’s abandonment of petitioner-client may constitute cause to excuse procedural 
default of claim); Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. at 1315 (postconviction counsel’s 
error resulting in procedural default of substantial trial ineffective assistance of coun-
sel claim may constitute cause to excuse default). 
 49. “[F]ederal courts on habeas corpus review of state prisoner claims . . . will 
presume that there is no independent and adequate state ground for a state court deci-
sion when the decision ‘fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be inter-
woven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible 
state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion.’”  Coleman, 501 U.S. at 
734–35 (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040–41 (1983)). 
 50. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81 (1977); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 
478 (1986). 
 51. See, e.g., Coleman, 501 U.S. at 726. 
 52. Id. at 750. 
 53. Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 87. 
 54. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488. 
 55. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 
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cent” of the offense of conviction.58  The probable innocence standard was 
further defined in Schlup v. Delo to be met when a petitioner presents “new 
facts [that] raise[] sufficient doubt about [the petitioner’s] guilt to undermine 
confidence in the result of the trial.”59 
In Coleman v. Thompson, the Court concluded that state postconviction 
counsel’s untimely filing of the appeal of petitioner’s habeas petition did not 
constitute “cause” to excuse the resulting procedural default in federal 
court.60  The Court observed generally that attorney error only provides cause 
to excuse a procedural default where counsel’s performance was constitu-
tionally ineffective.61  But because “[t]here is no constitutional right to an 
attorney in state post-conviction proceedings” under Pennsylvania v. Finley 
and Murray v. Giarratano, “a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel in such proceedings.”62 
Based on principles of agency, attorney error is not considered a factor 
external to the petitioner and imputed to the State.63  As a result, without a 
constitutional right to counsel, the federal courts will attribute such error di-
rectly to the petitioner.64  As in Finley and Giarratano, Coleman involved 
claims that the petitioner had litigated before the default at issue with the 
assistance of counsel whose competence was not in dispute.65  Hence, the 
Court reserved for another day resolution of the question whether attorney 
error may constitute cause to excuse a default when the error occurs during a 
petitioner’s first opportunity to litigate the claim at issue.66 
In my 2009 article, A Case for a Constitutional Right to Counsel in Ha-
beas Corpus, I argued that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clause con-
siderations underpinning the right to counsel on a first appeal of right similar-
ly compel recognition of a constitutional right to counsel in postconviction 
proceedings, where such proceedings provide the first forum for litigation of 
a particular claim.67  As with a direct appeal, postconviction litigation re-
quires a high degree of legal skill that a layperson generally lacks.68  Hence, 
 
 58. Murray, 477 U.S. at 494, 496. 
 59. 513 U.S. 298, 317 (1995). 
 60. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 757. 
 61. Id. at 752–53 (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 487 (citing Strickland v. Wash-
ington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984))). 
 62. Id. at 752 (citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987); Murray v. 
Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989); Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586 (1982)). 
 63. Id. at 753–54. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 755. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Uhrig, supra note 6. 
 68. Id. at 551–52.  For example, from my personal experience working as a staff 
attorney on habeas matters within the Ninth Circuit, attorneys seeking appointment to 
the panel of attorneys eligible to handle federal habeas appeals must demonstrate 
expertise within federal habeas, not merely experience in federal appellate criminal 
practice. 
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failure to provide the indigent with assistance of counsel discriminates 
against them, in that the indigent is unable to hire counsel to assist them and 
they are forced to go it alone.  Recognition of such a right to counsel, among 
other things, would provide the requisite cause under Coleman to a petitioner 
who suffers a default of a claim as a result of ineffective assistance of post-
conviction counsel. 
In October 2011, the Court granted certiorari on this issue in Martinez v. 
Ryan, but the decision did little to resolve the issue.69 
II.  MARTINEZ V. RYAN 
Petitioner Luis Martinez was convicted of two counts of sexual conduct 
with a minor under the age of fifteen – specifically, his eleven-year-old step-
daughter.70  The victim recanted prior to and during her trial testimony.71  
Nonetheless, the prosecution persevered with its case, introducing the vic-
tim’s nightgown, which contained traces of Martinez’s DNA.72  In addition, a 
prosecution expert testified that child victim recantations are often due to the 
mother’s failure to support the victim in her allegations.73  Martinez’s lawyer 
did not object to the expert testimony or call his own expert in rebuttal.74  The 
jury convicted Martinez, who was sentenced to two consecutive terms of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole for thirty-five years.75 
On direct appeal, Martinez received new appointed counsel to represent 
him.76  Appellate counsel argued a number of issues on Martinez’s behalf, 
including insufficiency of the evidence and that newly-discovered evidence 
warranted a new trial.77  Arizona law precludes raising ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel claims on direct appeal, even where the trial record by itself 
supports the claim.78  Thus, in Arizona, postconviction proceedings provide 
the first forum for review of such claims.79  For this reason, it was unremark-
able that Martinez’s appellate counsel raised no allegations of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal. 
While the direct appeal was still pending, somewhat inexplicably, appel-
late counsel also filed a “Notice of Post-Conviction Relief” with the trial 
court, which, under Arizona law, serves to trigger postconviction proceed-
ings.80  Counsel made no allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, 
 
 69. Martinez v. Ryan, 131 S. Ct. 2960 (2011). 
 70. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1313 (2012). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 1314. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1313. 
 76. Id. at 1314. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See id. (citing State v. Spreitz, 39 P.3d 525, 527 (Ariz. 2002) (en banc)). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. (citing ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 32.4(a) (2011)). 
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despite plausible bases for doing so.81  Instead, counsel filed a statement with 
the court that she was unable to identify any colorable claims for postconvic-
tion review.82  The court provided Martinez with forty-five days to file a pro 
se petition, which he did not do.  Martinez, who spoke Spanish and could not 
read the English-language paperwork that counsel mailed to him, later stated 
that he was entirely unaware of counsel’s initiation of postconviction pro-
ceedings and the need to file his own petition.83  The trial court agreed with 
counsel’s assessment that Martinez lacked grounds for postconviction relief 
and dismissed the action.84  The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, and the 
Arizona Supreme Court denied review.85 
About a year and a half later, Martinez, with new counsel, filed a second 
notice of postconviction relief in the trial court.86  In this petition, Martinez 
alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for both failing to object to the pros-
ecution’s expert testimony, which explained in culpable terms the victim’s 
recantations, and failing to call a (readily available) expert to rebut such tes-
timony.87  In addition, Martinez alleged that counsel was ineffective for fail-
ing to pursue an exculpatory explanation for the nightgown DNA evidence.88  
The trial court dismissed the petition, in relevant part, as procedurally barred 
under state law89 due to the failure to raise the claims in Martinez’s first post-
conviction proceeding initiated by prior state-appointed counsel.90  The Ari-
zona Court of Appeals affirmed and the Arizona Supreme Court again denied 
review.91 
Martinez filed in federal district court for habeas corpus relief under 28 
U.S.C. § 2254, again alleging the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims 
raised in his second round of state postconviction proceedings.92 Martinez 
recognized that the claim was subject to the procedural default doctrine be-
cause he had not raised it in his first state postconviction proceeding.93  None-
theless, he argued that he had “cause” to overcome the default.94  Specifical-
ly, Martinez alleged that the ineffectiveness of his first postconviction coun-
sel in failing both to raise the claims in the initial state postconviction pro-
 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. (citing ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 32.4(a) (2011)). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 1314–15 (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84–85, 90–91 
(1977)). 
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ceeding and to notify Martinez of her actions constituted “cause” to excuse 
the default.95 
The district court denied Martinez’s petition.96  The court found that Ar-
izona’s preclusion rule was an independent and adequate state ground to bar 
federal review under procedural default doctrine.97  The court also concluded 
that Martinez had not demonstrated cause to excuse the default because, un-
der Coleman v. Thompson,98 attorney errors during postconviction proceed-
ings do not qualify as cause due to the lack of a constitutional right to counsel 
in such proceedings.99 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed.100  In so doing, the court recognized that, 
where postconviction proceedings provide the first forum for review of a 
particular claim, the Supreme Court in Coleman had noted a possible excep-
tion to the general rule that the right to counsel does not extend beyond direct, 
non-discretionary appeal.101  But the Ninth Circuit declined to recognize such 
an exception.102  The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue.103 
As a threshold matter, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, recog-
nized that Coleman v. Thompson left open the issue as to whether an inmate 
has a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in “initial-review 
collateral proceedings,” i.e., postconviction proceedings that provide the first 
forum for judicial review of a claim challenging a criminal conviction.104  
Rather, at issue in Coleman was only whether ineffective assistance of coun-
sel during an appeal from an initial-review collateral proceeding could 
amount to cause to excuse a procedural default.105  This observation alone 
was remarkable because, since deciding Coleman in 1991, the Court had 
made no mention of this significant, open issue.106 Moreover, lower federal 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 1315. 
 97. Id.  Absent a showing of cause and prejudice, a state court’s reliance on a 
procedural rule that is independent of federal law and firmly established and consist-
ently applied precludes federal review of the underlying claim.  Walker v. Martin, 131 
S. Ct. 1120, 1127–28 (2011). 
 98. 501 U.S. 722, 753–55 (1991). 
 99. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Martinez v. Ryan, 131 S. Ct. 2960 (order granting certiorari); see also Mar-
tinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315. 
 104. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315. 
 105. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755 (emphasis added) (“Coleman 
contends that it was the ineffectiveness of his counsel during the appeal from [the 
state habeas trial court] that constitutes cause to excuse his default. . . .  We thus need 
to decide only whether Coleman had a constitutional right to counsel on appeal from 
the state habeas trial court judgment.  We conclude that he did not.”). 
 106. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1319 (“[I]n the 20 years since Coleman was de-
cided, we have not held Coleman applies in circumstances like this one.”); see also 
Uhrig, supra note 6, at 542. 
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courts, with few exceptions, had simply assumed that Coleman’s holding was 
not limited to its facts (an appeal from initial-review collateral proceedings), 
but also extended to an initial-review collateral proceeding itself.107 
Just as quickly, however, Justice Kennedy concluded that Martinez was 
not the case to resolve this difficult constitutional issue.108  Rather than ad-
dress the underlying issue as to whether a right to counsel attaches to claims 
that an inmate cannot raise until a postconviction proceeding, which in turn 
would provide cause to excuse the procedural default in Martinez’s case, the 
Court took a narrower approach.  Specifically, Justice Kennedy merely quali-
fied Coleman’s holding on equitable grounds to find that attorney error dur-
ing initial-review collateral proceedings may constitute “cause” to excuse an 
inmate’s procedural default of an ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
claim.109 
First, Justice Kennedy noted that initial-review collateral proceedings 
function in many respects as a direct appeal.110  Thus, as with a direct appeal, 
“When an attorney errs in [such] proceedings, it is likely that no state court at 
any level will hear the prisoner’s claim.”111  Moreover, the Court observed 
that “‘defendants pursuing first-tier review . . . are generally ill equipped to 
represent themselves’ because they do not have a brief from counsel or an 
opinion of the court addressing their claim of error.”112  The Court appreciat-
ed that “[t]he prisoner, unlearned in the law, may not comply with the State’s 
procedural rules or may misapprehend the substantive details of federal con-
stitutional law.”113  In addition, an inmate is unequipped to develop the factu-
al basis for claims that rely on evidence outside the trial record.114 
Additionally, the Court found the problem to be particularly acute where 
the claim is one of ineffective assistance of counsel.115  To make a viable 
Sixth Amendment claim under Strickland v. Washington, the inmate must 
proffer facts and present an intact argument that trial counsel was deficient, 
 
 107. See Uhrig, supra note 6, at 542. 
 108. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315, 1319 (“This is not the case, however, to resolve 
whether [a right to counsel in initial-review collateral proceedings] exists as a consti-
tutional matter.”). 
 109. Id. (“This opinion qualifies Coleman by recognizing a narrow exception: 
Inadequate assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings may establish 
cause for a prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.”). 
 110. Id. at 1316–17 (“Where, as here, the initial-review collateral proceeding is 
the first designated proceeding for a prisoner to raise a claim of ineffective assistance 
at trial, the collateral proceeding is in many ways the equivalent of a prisoner’s direct 
appeal as to the ineffective-assistance claim.”). 
 111. Id. at 1316. 
 112. Id. at 1317 (quoting Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 617 (2005)). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
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and that the inmate suffered prejudice as a result.116  To frame the issue 
properly, the inmate must understand trial strategy and the potential conse-
quences of specific decisions by counsel in the context of the overall proceed-
ings.117  This presents a tall task for any layperson, let alone one behind bars. 
But the Court placed the greatest emphasis on the nature of the right to 
effective assistance of counsel at trial, itself, describing it as “a bedrock prin-
ciple in our justice system.”118  Invoking Gideon’s assessment as an “‘obvi-
ous truth’ the idea that ‘any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a 
lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him,’”119 
Justice Kennedy observed that “the right to counsel is the foundation for our 
adversary system.  Defense counsel tests the prosecution’s case to ensure that 
the proceedings serve the function of adjudicating guilt or innocence, while 
protecting the rights of the person charged.”120 
The Court also noted the critical role defense counsel plays in preserv-
ing issues for direct appellate review and postconviction proceedings.121  
Thus, by requiring an inmate to raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
outside of the direct appeal process, where there is no constitutional right to 
counsel, the inmate is more likely to litigate his claims pro se and the state 
“significantly diminishes [his] ability to file such claims.”122 
After invoking precedent informing the constitutional right to counsel at 
trial, the Court returned to procedural default doctrine: 
Allowing a federal habeas court to hear a claim of ineffective assis-
tance of trial counsel when an attorney’s errors (or the absence of an 
attorney) caused a procedural default in an initial review collateral 
proceeding acknowledges, as an equitable matter, that the initial-
review collateral proceeding, if undertaken without counsel or with 
ineffective counsel, may not have been sufficient to ensure that proper 
consideration was given to a substantial claim.123 
Thus, where the state appoints counsel who renders ineffective assis-
tance as measured under the standards of Strickland or fails to appoint coun-
 
 116. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (“First, the defend-
ant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient.  This requires showing that 
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guar-
anteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.  Second, the defendant must show that 
the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.  This requires showing that coun-
sel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose 
result is reliable.”). 
 117. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. (quoting Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963)). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 1317–18. 
 122. Id. at 1318. 
 123. Id. at 1312 (emphasis added). 
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sel altogether, and a substantial ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim is 
not raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding as a result, an inmate may 
establish cause for a resulting procedural default.124 
In casting the right to assistance of counsel as equitable, rather than con-
stitutional, the Court offered a solution to the infinite continuum of habeas 
dilemmas posited by a constitutional right to counsel: 
A constitutional ruling would provide defendants a freestanding con-
stitutional claim to raise; it would require the appointment of counsel 
in initial-review collateral proceedings; it would impose the same sys-
tem of appointing counsel in every State; and it would require a rever-
sal in all state collateral cases on direct review from state courts if the 
States’ system of appointing counsel did not conform to the constitu-
tional rule.  An equitable ruling, by contrast, permits States a variety 
of systems for appointing counsel in initial-review collateral proceed-
ings.  And it permits a State to elect between appointing counsel in 
initial-review collateral proceedings or not asserting a procedural de-
fault and raising a defense on the merits in federal habeas proceed-
ings.125 
In dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, excoriated the ma-
jority’s attempt at crafting a more limited basis for relief for Martinez.126  
First, Justice Scalia describes the majority’s casting of Martinez’s right to 
initial-review postconviction counsel as equitable in nature, rather than con-
stitutional, to be a distinction without a difference.127  Under either rubric, the 
result is the same: Martinez’s default of the claim at issue is excused, and 
federal courts are able to consider its merit.128  Moreover, Justice Scalia dis-
missed as fiction the majority’s attempt to cast its holding in limited terms: 
[N]o one really believes that the newly announced “equitable” rule 
will remain limited to ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel cases.  
There is not a dime’s worth of difference in principle between those 
cases and many other cases in which initial state habeas will be the 
first opportunity for a particular claim to be raised, [such as claims al-
leging prosecutorial withholding of exculpatory evidence, newly dis-
covered impeachment evidence, and claims of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel].129 
 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 1319–20. 
 126. See id. at 1321 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
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Justice Scalia further described the majority’s “soothing assertion” to the 
contrary as “insult[ing] the reader’s intelligence.”130 
The following term, in Trevino v. Thaler, the Court clarified that its 
holding extended to jurisdictions where state law, on its face, permits inmates 
to raise a substantial ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, but in 
practice, the structure of the state system makes it virtually impossible to do 
so.131 
This Article takes up Justice Scalia’s dismissal of the majority’s logic 
and evaluates the sustainability of its limited holding.  How, if at all, can 
Martinez’s holding – that petitioners have an equitable right to assistance of 
counsel in initial-review collateral proceedings raising trial ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claims – remain limited to trial ineffective assistance of 
counsel? 
Ultimately, this Article argues that, despite the relative and uncontro-
verted gravitas of Gideon v. Wainwright, such limitation is unsustainable in 
light of the historical and modern function of habeas corpus.  To start, I as-
sess the nature of Gideon to evaluate what precisely it is that makes Gideon 
such a storied criminal procedure right.  With that understanding, I then con-
sider the history and role of the Great Writ.  Finally, I evaluate whether Gide-
on deserves the unique protection Martinez sanctions for it under the writ, 
which in the context of procedural default, enables a remedy for violations of 
Gideon’s mandate (as enforced through Strickland v. Washington), but none 
for any other claims of constitutional violations. 
III.  DOES MARTINEZ COMPEL RECOGNITION OF AN EQUITABLE 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN PROCEDURAL DEFAULT DOCTRINE FOR 
CLAIMS OTHER THAN INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL? 
A.  What Makes Gideon v. Wainwright So Special? 
Since Gideon’s trumpet sounded,132 the Court has made clear that the 
right to assistance of counsel at trial is a fundamental one,133 which functions 
as a necessary corollary to the right to a fair trial itself.134  Indeed, in Gideon, 
 
 130. Id. 
 131. Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1914–15 (2013). 
 132. See ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET (1964) (providing a history of 
Clarence Earl Gideon’s triumphant battle to achieve recognition of a right to counsel 
at trial for individuals facing felony charges). 
 133. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 374 (1986) (“The right to coun-
sel is a fundamental right of criminal defendants. . . .”); United States v. Cronic, 466 
U.S. 648, 653 (1984) (“An accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a funda-
mental component of our criminal justice system.”); Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 
(1988) (“It bears emphasis that the right to be represented by counsel is among the 
most fundamental of rights.”). 
 134. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (“[The] right to 
counsel exists, and is needed, in order to protect the fundamental right to a fair tri-
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the Court observed that “[the assistance of counsel] is one of the safeguards 
of the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human 
rights of life and liberty. . . .  The Sixth Amendment stands as a constant ad-
monition that if the constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will 
not still be done.”135  Martinez reiterated the sentiment: “The right to the ef-
fective assistance of counsel at trial is a bedrock principle in our justice sys-
tem . . . [and] is the foundation for our adversary system.”136 
From all the accolades emerge several themes regarding Gideon’s status 
as a fundamental criminal procedure right.  First, the Court has observed that 
the right to counsel is essential to protect the accused’s remaining constitu-
tional and legal rights.137  Left to fend for himself, a criminal defendant lack-
ing literacy in the law and legal process will be unable to assert his myriad 
constitutional and legal rights.138  In Penson, the Court noted: 
As a general matter, it is through counsel that all other rights of the 
accused are protected: “Of all the rights that an accused person has, 
the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for 
it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have.”139 
A second characteristic underpinning Gideon’s special status is that the 
right to counsel is necessary to ensure the successful functioning of the ad-
versarial system.  Without pushback from competent defense counsel, the 
criminal process in effect devolves into a unilateral, un-resisted prosecution.  
Again in Penson, the Court noted: 
[The adversarial system] is premised on the well-tested principle that 
truth – as well as fairness – is best discovered by powerful statements 
on both sides of the question. . . .  Absent representation, however, it 
is unlikely that a criminal defendant will be able to test the govern-
ment’s case, for . . . even the intelligent and educated layman has 
small and sometimes no skill in the science of the law.140 
 
al.”); Brescia v. New Jersey, 417 U.S. 921 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The 
centrality of the right to counsel among the rights accorded a criminal defendant is 
self-evident . . . .”). 
 135. 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963) (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 
304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938)). 
 136. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2012); see also Kimmelman, 477 
U.S. at 374 (stating the right to counsel “assures the fairness, and thus the legitimacy, 
of our adversary process”). 
 137. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 (1988) (quoting Walter V. Schaefer, Feder-
alism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1956)); see also Kim-
melman, 477 U.S. at 377 (quoting Schaefer, supra); Cronic, 466 U.S. at 654 (quoting 
Schaefer, supra). 
 140. 488 U.S. at 84 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
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In elaborating on counsel’s role, the Court, in McCoy v. Court of Ap-
peals of Wisconsin, District 1, noted: 
The guiding hand of counsel is essential for the evaluation of the pros-
ecution’s case, the determination of trial strategy, the possible negotia-
tion of a plea bargain and, if the case goes to trial, making sure that the 
prosecution can prove the State’s case with evidence that was lawfully 
obtained and may lawfully be considered by the trier of fact.141 
In short, the right to counsel is crucial to enable the criminally accused to 
meet and respond to the prosecution’s case effectively.142 
The inability to respond with professional competency to criminal 
charges in turn increases the risk that the innocent will be convicted of crimes 
they did not in fact commit.  Hence, the Court has also observed that the right 
to counsel at trial is essential to guard against this risk.143  In Gideon, the 
Court noted that “[w]ithout [the right to counsel], though he not be guilty, [a 
defendant] faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to 
establish his innocence.”144  Similarly, in Whorton v. Bockting, decided in 
2007, the Court underscored, “When a defendant who wishes to be represent-
ed by counsel is denied representation . . . the risk of an unreliable verdict is 
intolerably high.”145 
A third interest behind the right to trial counsel is equal access to justice.  
Again, returning to Gideon itself, the Court observed: 
[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person hailed into 
court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial 
unless counsel is provided for him. . . .  That government hires law-
yers to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to 
defend are the strongest indications of the widespread belief that law-
yers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.146 
 
 141. 486 U.S. 429, 435 (1988) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 142. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (internal citations 
and quotations omitted) (“The right to counsel plays a crucial role in the adversarial 
system embodied in the Sixth Amendment, since access to counsel’s skill and 
knowledge is necessary to accord defendants the ample opportunity to meet the case 
of the prosecution to which they are entitled.”). 
 143. The first interest – in being able to respond effectively to the prosecution’s 
charges – affects all criminal defendants.  This second interest, though closely related 
to the first, impacts only those who are in fact actually innocent. 
 144. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (quoting Powell v. Ala-
bama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)).  See also Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577–78 (1986) 
(“Without [the right to counsel and other constitutional protections], a criminal trial 
cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or inno-
cence.”). 
 145. 549 U.S. 406, 419 (2007). 
 146. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344. 
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Noting the procedural and substantive aspirations of the state and feder-
al criminal process “to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which 
every defendant stands equal before the law[,]” the Court warned, “This no-
ble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his 
accusers without a lawyer to assist him.”147 
Lastly, as a result of the above interests, the right to counsel stands alone 
among the constitutional rights that protect the criminally accused in that it 
functions to ensure fairness – and hence, reliability – at every step of the 
criminal process.  Thus, the Court has noted that without a right to counsel, 
“[A] serious risk of injustice infects the trial itself.”148 
B.  The History and Role of the Great Writ of Habeas Corpus 
1.  The Historical Role of the Writ 
Since its inception in English common law, the writ of habeas corpus – 
the Great Writ of Liberty – has functioned, to varying degrees,149 as the 
means by which an individual may challenge the legality of his detention.  
Historian Paul Halliday describes “the central fact of habeas corpus” as “that 
a judge should hear the sighs of all prisoners, regardless of where, how, or by 
whom they were held.”150  Indeed, the Great Writ found its English common 
law roots in the Magna Carta’s general decree that “no man would be impris-
oned contrary to the law of the land.”151  Over time, “[T]he writ of habeas 
corpus became the means by which the promise of Magna Carta was ful-
filled.”152 
With the Suspension Clause, the Framers of the U.S. Constitution gave 
the writ “prominent sanction.”153  Written as a negative directive, the Suspen-
sion Clause provides that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall 
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public 
 
 147. Id. 
 148. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984) (quoting Cuyler v. Sulli-
van, 446 U.S. 335, 343 (1980)). 
 149. See PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE 
(2010) (describing the vacillating power of the writ in English common law, with the 
historical apex of its muscle coinciding with its incorporation into U.S. Constitution). 
 150. Id.  (tracing and analyzing history of Great Writ in English common law). 
 151. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 740 (2008) (citing Art. 39, in SOURCES 
OF OUR LIBERTIES 17 (R. Perry & J. Cooper eds. 1959)). 
 152. Id. at 740 (citing WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, 9 A HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
LAW 112 (1926)).  See also Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. 85, 95 (1868) (noting the Habe-
as Corpus Act of May 27, 1679 firmly guaranteed habeas corpus “‘for the better se-
curing of the liberty of the subject,’ which, as Blackstone says, ‘is frequently consid-
ered as another Magna Charta’”); WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
LAWS OF ENGLAND, 129 (6th ed. 1775) (describing the writ as “efficacious . . . in all 
manner of illegal confinement”). 
 153. Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. at 95. 
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Safety may require it.”154  For centuries now, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
interpreted the Suspension Clause as constitutionalizing the writ’s fundamen-
tal role in ensuring the legality of executive detentions.155  Indeed, until the 
1980s, the scope and vigor of habeas corpus had gradually expanded 
throughout the history of the United States, peaking with the Warren Court in 
the 1960s.156  But even with the dramatic restrictions to the writ effected by 
Teague v. Lane157 and AEDPA158 over the past fifteen years, the purpose of 
the writ has, at least in theory, remained unwavering.159 
In Ex parte McCardle, decided in 1867, the Court expansively described 
the writ as providing a judicial remedy for “every possible case of privation 
of liberty contrary to” the U.S. Constitution, treaty, and federal statutory 
law.160  In the early twentieth century, the Court described the writ as offering 
a judicial remedy for state prisoners whose custody results from a violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s right to due process or equal protection of the 
law.161  Similarly, in 1910, the Court observed that the writ’s function is to 
assess whether a detention contravenes legal authority or whether “a denial of 
a right secured under the Federal Constitution” has occurred.162  The Court 
has invoked similar rhetoric to describe the writ’s function on many subse-
quent occasions.163  Likewise, for state prisoners, since enactment of the Ju-
 
 154. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 155. See, e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723; Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. 193, 202–03 
(1830) (describing the statutory writ of habeas corpus as “in the nature of a writ of 
error, to examine the legality of the commitment” and “to liberate an individual from 
unlawful imprisonment”). 
 156. This article does not attempt a thorough summary of this historical progres-
sion, which witnessed an evolution of habeas corpus from permitting challenges to 
federal court jurisdiction only to approximately mimicking the scope of direct appeal.  
For such a summary, see RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS 
CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2.4 (6th ed. 2014). 
 157. 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (subject to two limited exceptions, prohibiting recogni-
tion of new rules of law in federal habeas proceedings). 
 158. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012). 
 159. See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 156, at 22–29. 
 160. 73 U.S. 318, 325–26 (1868). 
 161. See Felts v. Murphy, 201 U.S. 123, 129 (1906) 
 162. Harlan v. McGourin, 218 U.S. 442, 447 (1910). 
 163. See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87–88, 91 (1923) (describing the writ 
as the judicial vehicle for “securing to the petitioners their constitutional rights”); 
McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 136 (1934) (describing the writ as the mechanism “by 
which the legality of the detention of one in the custody of another [court] could be 
tested judicially”); Daniels v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 510 (1953) (describing the writ as 
providing “final say” to the federal courts regarding whether “State Supreme Courts 
have denied rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution”); Fay v. Noia, 372 
U.S. 391, 426 (1963) (describing the writ as a basis for federal judicial relief “con-
ferred by the allegation of an unconstitutional restraint [that] is not defeated by any-
thing that may occur in the state court proceedings”); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 
494 n.37 (describing the writ as providing a forum “for litigating constitutional claims 
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diciary Act of 1867,164 the Court has described the writ as the means “to test 
the constitutional validity of a conviction for crime.”165 
More recently, with its 2008 decision in Boumediene v. Bush, the Court 
thwarted Congress’s attempt to strip the habeas corpus remedy from alien 
detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.166  In so doing, the Court again empha-
sized the crucial role of habeas corpus throughout both English common law 
and American history: 
The Framers viewed freedom from unlawful restraint as a fundamental 
precept of liberty, and they understood the writ of habeas corpus as a 
vital instrument to secure that freedom.  Experience taught, however, 
that the common-law writ all too often had been insufficient to guard 
against the abuse of monarchial power.  That history counseled the 
necessity for specific language in the Constitution to secure the writ 
and ensure its place in our legal system.167  
With this function in mind, the Framers adopted the Suspension Clause 
as part of the U.S. Constitution.168  The Suspension Clause “ensures that, 
except during periods of formal suspension, the Judiciary will have a time-
tested device, the writ, to maintain the ‘delicate balance of governance’ that is 
 
generally”); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 79 (1977) (describing as “always fair 
game” the writ to enable “a state prisoner’s challenge [in federal court] to the trial 
court’s resolution of dispositive federal issues”); Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) 
(quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972)) (describing the function of the 
writ “to ‘interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians 
of the people’s federal rights – to protect the people from unconstitutional action’”); 
McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 479 (1991) (describing the writ as the vehicle for 
resolving “all dispositive constitutional claims presented in a proper procedural man-
ner”); Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 697–98 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 449 (1963) (Har-
lan, J., dissenting), abrogated by Coleman v. Thompson, 522 U.S. 722 (1991)) (not-
ing “today, as it has always been, [the writ is] a fundamental safeguard against unlaw-
ful custody . . . [that can remedy any detention] in violation of the Constitution or 
laws or treaties of the United States”); O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 442 
(1995) (describing the writ as a remedy whose “most basic traditions and purposes” 
are to “avoid a grievous wrong – holding a person in custody in violation of the Con-
stitution . . . of the United States” and “thereby both [to] protect[] individuals from 
unconstitutional convictions and [to] help[] to guarantee the integrity of the criminal 
process by assuring that trials are fundamentally unfair”).  See generally HERTZ & 
LIEBMAN, supra note 156, at 24–26. 
 164. See Judiciary Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385–87 (expand-
ing the writ to enable challenges to state criminal convictions). 
 165. Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104–05 (1942) (per curiam). 
 166. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 167. Id. 732. 
 168. Id. at 745. 
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itself the surest safeguard of liberty.”169  The Court in Boumediene empha-
sized that the Suspension Clause “protects the rights of the detained by af-
firming the duty and authority of the Judiciary to call the jailer to account.”170  
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, further observed: 
The laws and Constitution are designed to survive, and remain in 
force, in extraordinary times.  Liberty and security can be reconciled; 
and in our system they are reconciled within the framework of the law.  
The Framers decided that habeas corpus, a right of first importance, 
must be part of that framework, a part of that law.171 
Despite this consistently articulated aim, in recent decades the Court has 
sanctioned substantial restrictions on the parameters for relief under the Great 
Writ.  But in so doing, until Martinez, neither the Court nor Congress had 
done so by differentiating between constitutional violations and elevating 
some rights over others.  Rather, limits on available relief stem from: (1) ex-
cising Mapp v. Ohio’s exclusionary rule from the underlying Fourth Amend-
ment violation; (2) common law172 and statutory173 prohibitions on retroactive 
application of new rules of constitutional law to antecedent convictions and 
imposing a heightened standard for harmless error review in postconviction 
proceedings; (3) imposition of an elevated harmless error test for claims 
raised in federal habeas; and (4) the myriad procedural restrictions under the 
common law and AEDPA.  As I will discuss, none of these limitations turn 
on the nature of the constitutional violation that a petitioner alleges.  Rather, 
the Court has consistently and emphatically maintained that federal habeas 
remains the forum for all state detainee claims of a constitutional nature. 
2.  Stone v. Powell and the Unenforceable Fourth Amendment        
Exclusionary Rule 
In Stone v. Powell, the Court held that Fourth Amendment violations – 
or more precisely, the applicability of the exclusionary rule to evidence seized 
as a result of Fourth Amendment violations – are not cognizable in habeas as 
long as the petitioner had an adequate opportunity to litigate the claim in state 
court.174  The basis for this holding was not, however, to relegate the Fourth 
Amendment to second-tier status for purposes of enforceability.  Rather, the 
decision stems directly from the Court’s ongoing skepticism regarding the 
constitutional justifications of the exclusionary rule, as established in Mapp v. 
 
 169. Id. (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (plurality opin-
ion)). 
 170. Id. at 745. 
 171. Id. at 798. 
 172. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 328 (1989). 
 173. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2254 (2012). 
 174. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
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Ohio.175  Fourth Amendment violations occur at the moment of an illegal 
search and seizure.176  Hence, the Court has described the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule as prophylactic in nature in that, at best, it can only deter 
future violations against other individuals.177  Indeed, in reaching its decision 
in Stone, the Court emphasized that it was “not concerned with the scope of 
the habeas corpus statute as authority for litigating constitutional claims,” but 
rather only with the extent to which the writ is available to litigate claims 
based on “the exclusionary rule[, which] is a judicially created remedy rather 
than a personal constitutional right.”178  Thus, Stone is entirely consistent 
with the Court’s jurisprudence regarding the cognizability of all constitution-
al claims in federal habeas. 
Since Stone, the Court has stood firm in refusing to apply the case to bar 
review of any constitutional claims179 and at least some “merely prophylac-
tic” rules with constitutional underpinnings of a more fundamental nature 
than the exclusionary rule in Mapp v. Ohio.  In Withrow v. Williams,180 the 
Court rejected the State’s argument that Stone’s rule should extend to claims 
alleging violations of Miranda v. Arizona.181  In contrast to the Fourth 
Amendment’s exclusionary rule, Miranda protects – and importantly, pre-
vents violations of – an individual’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.182  Specifically, the Court has held that the State does not vio-
late the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination until it intro-
duces at trial statements obtained in violation of Miranda.183  Thus, applica-
tion of the Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule in fact does prevent violation 
of the privilege against self-incrimination.184  As a result, the Court held Mi-
randa violations to be cognizable in federal habeas.185 
 
 175. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 176. Stone, 428 U.S. at 479. 
 177. Id. (quoting Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 224 (1969)) (“[T]he 
exclusion of illegally seized evidence is simply a prophylactic device intended gener-
ally to deter Fourth Amendment violations by law enforcement officers.”). 
 178. Id. at 477 n.37 (emphasis added). 
 179. See Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 348 n.7 (1994) (summarizing relevant 
cases). 
 180. 507 U.S. 680, 688 (1993). 
 181. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 182. Withrow, 507 U.S. at 708–09. 
 183. See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 641 (2004). 
 184. See Withrow, 507 U.S. at 689–91. 
 185. Id. at 682. 
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3.  Retroactivity Analysis 
a.  The Common Law: Teague v. Lane 
More categorically, in Teague v. Lane, decided in 1989, a plurality of 
the Court substantially limited the scope of relief available in habeas.186  Prior 
to Teague, the Court regularly announced new rules of criminal procedure in 
habeas.187  The Teague doctrine, as it has come to be known, prohibits peti-
tioners from using the writ to enforce new rules of constitutional criminal 
procedure that come into force after the petitioner’s conviction has become 
final on direct appeal.188  Likewise, petitioners may no longer use the writ as 
a vehicle to establish a new rule of criminal procedure or to apply settled case 
law in a manner sufficiently novel to result in the creation of a new rule.189 
There are two exceptions to the Teague bar on retroactive application of 
new rules of criminal procedure.  First, petitioners may seek enforcement of a 
new rule of criminal law that, in effect, decriminalizes the conduct underlying 
their conviction or prohibits certain punishment for a category of defendants 
due to their status or offense.190  Examples have included Court decisions 
holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits execution of juveniles and the 
mentally ill.191 
Second, notwithstanding the Teague bar, petitioners may seek enforce-
ment of a new rule of criminal procedure that affects fact-finding reliability 
and qualifies as “fundamental,” “bedrock,” or “watershed,” i.e., “implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty.”192  To qualify, the new rule must be “essential 
to the accuracy and fairness of the criminal process.”193 
The Court has deemed Gideon v. Wainwright to be the paradigm exam-
ple of this exception.194  Such designation was illustrative only in that Gideon 
had been precedent for over twenty-five years prior to Teague.  Hence, when 
Teague was decided, petitioners were no longer seeking its retroactive en-
forcement.  Instead, the Court cited the decision as an example of the requi-
site gravitas a new rule of criminal procedure would need to qualify under the 
 
 186. 489 U.S. 288, 308 (1989). 
 187. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1966). 
 188. Teague, 489 U.S. at 292. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 307.  Accord Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 329–30 (1989); Graham 
v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 477 (1993). 
 191. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306 (2002) (finding Eight Amendment 
prohibits executing the mentally retarded); Roper v. Simmons, 542 U.S. 551, 555 
(2005) (finding that the Eight Amendment prohibits executing individuals who were 
under the age of 18 at the time of commission of the capital offense). 
 192. Teague, 489 U.S. at 292.  Accord Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 
620 (1998); O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 157, 167 (1997); Lambrix v. Sin-
gletary, 520 U.S. 518, 540 (1997); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 170 (1996). 
 193. Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 243 (1990). 
 194. See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 417–21 (2007). 
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second Teague bar exception.195  Since Teague, the Court has yet to identify a 
new rule of criminal procedure that qualifies under its second exception.196  
Indeed, in Teague itself, the Court expressed doubt as to whether such a rule 
has yet to emerge in criminal procedure.197 
Aside from Teague’s second exception, which to date the Court has 
never applied to an actual claim raised in an actual case, Teague does nothing 
to differentiate between constitutional violations.  Rather, the doctrine func-
tions to limit the timeframe within which a petitioner may identify the law 
governing particular constitutional claims for habeas litigation.  The Court’s 
hypothetical invocation of Gideon as an example of the second Teague ex-
ception does not establish a hierarchy of enforcement value within habeas 
corpus. 
Indeed, pre-Teague, the Court underscored that retroactivity analysis in 
no way reflects the Court’s assessment of the relative value of criminal pro-
cedure rights: 
We here stress that the choice between retroactivity and nonretroactiv-
ity in no way turns on the value of the constitutional guarantee in-
volved.  The right to be represented by counsel at trial, applied retro-
actively in Gideon v. Wainwright . . . has been described . . . as ‘by far 
the most pervasive [o]f all of the rights that an accused person has.’  
Yet Justice Brandeis even more boldly characterized the immunity 
from unjustifiable intrusions upon privacy, which was denied retroac-
tive enforcement in Linkletter [v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965)] as ‘the 
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized 
 
 195. Id. 
 196. See id. at 409 (holding Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), was not 
a watershed rule of criminal procedure); Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 408 (2004) 
(holding Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988) was not a watershed rule of criminal 
procedure); Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 355 (2004) (noting the new rule 
under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 588 (2002) that “[c]apital defendants . . . are 
entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an 
increase in their maximum punishment” does not qualify under Teague’s second 
exception); O’Dell, 521 U.S. at 168 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding a new rule under 
Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994) requiring jurors in capital case de-
ciding whether future dangerousness warrants death sentence be instructed that the 
only statutory alternative to death was life without the possibility of parole does not 
qualify under second Teague bar exception).  See also Ezra D. Landes, A New Ap-
proach to Overcoming the Insurmountable “Watershed Rule” Exception to Teague’s 
Collateral Review Killer, 74 MO. L. REV. 1, 10–12 (2009) (discussing the Court’s 
failure to identify any case other than Gideon as qualifying under the second excep-
tion to the Teague bar). 
 197. See Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 243 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 313) (noting “be-
cause the second exception is directed only at new rules essential to the accuracy and 
fairness of the criminal process, it is ‘unlikely that many such components of basic 
due process have yet to emerge’”); Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478 (1993) 
(noting second Teague exception applies “only to a small core of rules,” most of 
which have long since been enshrined in the law). 
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men.’  To reiterate what was said in Linkletter, we do not disparage a 
constitutional guarantee in any manner by declining to apply it retro-
actively.198  
b.  Statutory Limitations Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) 
In 1996, with enactment of AEDPA, Congress codified, and expanded 
upon, the legal sentiment behind Teague.  As amended, § 2254(d)(1) of 
AEDPA provides that the writ: 
shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on 
the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the 
claim . . . resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as deter-
mined by the Supreme Court of the United States.199 
As with Teague, § 2254(d)(1) limits petitioners to rules of criminal pro-
cedure already in existence at the time that the state adjudicated the merits of 
a particular claim.200  Unlike Teague, however, there are no exceptions to § 
2254(d)(1)’s limited scope.201  Moreover, its effect is even more restrictive in 
that federal courts can only consider U.S. Supreme Court precedent in evalu-
ating whether a constitutional violation has occurred.  Hence, whereas 
Teague permits courts to consider circuit court case law in evaluating the 
state of the law at the time of a state court’s adjudication, § 2254(d)(1) limits 
that consideration to U.S. Supreme Court decisions only.202 
Undoubtedly, § 2254(d)(1) substantially limits the availability of relief 
in federal habeas by narrowly defining the constitutional law that determines 
whether a violation has occurred.  But as with Teague, this provision in no 
way enables consideration of some constitutional claims while prohibiting 
evaluation of others.  Rather, all claims of constitutional error are subject to 
the same heightened standard of review.  And indeed, despite AEDPA’s nar-
rowing of the bases for relief in federal habeas, the Court has continued to 
underscore the writ’s “vital role in protecting constitutional rights.”203 
 
 198. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 728 (1966) (holding Miranda to be not 
retroactive). 
 199. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000).  In one respect, § 
2254(d)(1) is less restrictive than Teague.  See id.  Under § 2254(d)(1), federal courts 
evaluate the state court decision, whether rendered on direct appeal or during state 
postconviction proceedings, denying the merits of a particular claim.  Id.  In contrast, 
under Teague, federal courts may only consider rules of law in existence at the time 
the petitioner’s conviction becomes final on direct appeal.  Id. 
 203. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483 (2000); Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 
631 (2010) (quoting Slack, 529 U.S. at 483). 
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4.  Harmless Error Analysis Under Brecht v. Abrahamson 
Under both Teague and § 2254(d) of AEDPA, merits analysis of claims 
in federal habeas also requires application of the standard of review that the 
Court articulated in Brecht v. Abrahamson for assessing “harmless error.”204  
In Brecht, the Court adopted for federal habeas review the standard for as-
sessing harmlessness of nonconstitutional errors set forth in 1946 in Kottea-
kos v. United States.205  Once a federal court determines that a constitutional 
error occurred in the prosecution of a petitioner, such error will be deemed 
harmless unless it “had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in de-
termining the jury’s verdict.”206  The State bears the burden of persuading the 
court that an error was harmless.207  This standard is more stringent than the 
harmless error test applied on direct appeal (and that, pre-Brecht, also gov-
erned habeas review), which permits relief for constitutional violations unless 
the prosecution proves the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.208  The 
Court justified the elevated standard for federal habeas review based on “the 
State’s interest in the finality of convictions that have survived direct review 
within the state court system” and “comity and federalism.”209 
Here, the Court’s approach differs analytically depending on the type of 
constitutional violation at issue.  Even after Brecht, constitutional errors of a 
“structural” nature are deemed per se prejudicial and hence, not subject to 
harmless error analysis.210 
Trial error “occur[s] during the presentation of the case to the jury,” 
and is amenable to harmless-error analysis because it “may . . . be 
quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in 
order to determine [the effect it had on the trial].”  At the other end of 
 
 204. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 622 (1993).  The Supreme Court has 
not directly addressed whether Brecht, a pre-AEDPA decision, applies intact to 
claims brought under AEDPA.  See, e.g., Gutierrez v. McGinnis, 389 F.3d 300, 304 
(2d Cir. 2004) (“AEDPA may not overrule Brecht directly but the statute’s implica-
tions do call Brecht’s continuing viability into question.”); Sanna v. DiPaolo, 265 
F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2001) (finding that Brecht applies in conjunction with amended § 
2254(d) but noting that “there is some disagreement as to whether the Brecht standard 
survives the passage of the AEDPA”).  But the Court has inferred that harmless error 
analysis remains unchanged post-AEDPA by applying Brecht unmodified to cases 
governed by AEDPA.  See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 10–11 (2002) (per curiam); 
Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795–96 (2001).  See also HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra 
note 156, at § 30.2 n.19, § 31.1 n.12 (discussing unsettled nature of the issue). 
 205. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 
750, 776 (1946)). 
 206. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776. 
 207. See O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 435–36 (1995). 
 208. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
 209. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 635.  This observation provoked harsh critique from the 
dissent.  Id. at 656 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 210. Id. at 629–30 (majority opinion). 
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the spectrum of constitutional errors lie “structural defects in the con-
stitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by ‘harmless-
error’ standards.”  The existence of such defects – deprivation of the 
right to counsel, for example – requires automatic reversal of the con-
viction because they infect the entire trial process.211 
The list of constitutional errors that the Court has deemed structural at 
this point is long and includes the right to counsel/counsel of choice at critical 
stages of the proceedings at trial and on direct appeal;212 the right to represent 
oneself;213 the right to prosecutorial disclosure of material exculpatory evi-
dence, where materiality is defined as at minimum a “reasonable probability” 
that had disclosure occurred, the outcome of the proceeding would have been 
different;214 other due process or speedy trial violations requiring proof of 
prejudice, which in turn is defined as at least a reasonable probability that but 
for the error, the result of the trial would have been different;215 the right to an 
impartial judge;216 the right to a trial by an impartial jury,217 including a capi-
tal sentencing jury;218 the right to a grand and petit jury selected in a manner 
free of racial discrimination;219 the right to a public trial;220 the right to a jury 
verdict based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt;221 in capital cases, the 
right to a sentencing process that properly limits the categories of offenses 
and offenders eligible for the death penalty222 and accords proper weighing of 
aggravating and mitigating factors;223 and the right to a direct appeal.224 
The Court has identified three bases on which it has categorized an error 
as structural.225  First, there are errors that render a trial fundamentally unfair 
and deprive a defendant of the basic protections required for a trial to reliably 
 
 211. Id. at 629–30, 638 (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 271, 307–08, 
309 (1991)). 
 212. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150, 152 (2006); Bell v. 
Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695–96 (2002); Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166 (2002); 
Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 483 (2000); Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 
461, 469 (1997); Fulminante, 499 U.S. 294; Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.  75, 88–89 
(1988). 
 213. See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 148–49. 
 214. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995). 
 215. See id. at 435. 
 216. See, e.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999); Edwards v. Balisok, 
520 U.S. 641, 647 (1997). 
 217. See, e.g., Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577–78 (1986). 
 218. See, e.g., Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668 (1987) (plurality opinion). 
 219. See, e.g., Neder, 527 U.S. at 8. 
 220. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 148–49. 
 221. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279–81 (1993). 
 222. See, e.g., Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362–63, 365–66 (1988). 
 223. See, e.g., Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212 (2006). 
 224. See, e.g., Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 484 (2000). 
 225. See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 156, at § 31.3. 
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determine guilt or innocence.226  Included in this category are complete dep-
rivation of counsel and trial before a biased judge.227 
A second category of structural error are those errors for which it is 
simply too difficult to assess the effect of the error, i.e., actual prejudice.228  
Errors in this category include improper deprivation of one’s counsel of 
choice; deprivation of the right to a public trial; selection of a petit jury based 
“upon improper criteria;” and “exposure [of a petit jury] to prejudicial public-
ity.”229 
The third category of structural error applies where harmlessness is ir-
relevant, and accordingly, Brecht analysis is futile.230  An example would be 
denial of the right to self-representation at trial, which usually improves a 
defendant’s chances of achieving a favorable outcome.231 
As such, there is an analytic differentiation between constitutional viola-
tions.  But the difference in treatment in no way translates to what Martinez, 
read on its face, accomplishes: a basis for only salvaging merits consideration 
of substantial ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims otherwise forfeited 
by postconviction counsel error (or lack of postconviction counsel altogeth-
er).  Rather, the difference in harmless error analysis merely reflects differ-
ences in the nature of the respective constitutional errors and the harm that 
accompanies each one. 
5.  Procedural Restrictions Under AEDPA 
Additionally, Congress and the Court have imposed procedural hurdles 
on petitioners who seek habeas corpus relief.  But again, the applicability of 
these rules in no way turns on the nature of the substantive constitutional 
claims that the petitioner seeks to raise. 
Section 2244(d) sets forth a one-year statute of limitations for filing a 
federal petition once a conviction becomes final on direct appeal.232  With 
complicated statutory and, since Holland v. Florida,233 equitable tolling pro-
visions, the one-year time period ceases to run when state courts have control 
of the case or where extraordinary circumstances aside from the petitioner’s 
due diligence make it impossible to file in a timely fashion.234  At no time, 
however, does the nature of the constitutional claims raised in the federal 
petition dictate the timeliness calculation.235 
 
 226. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1999). 
 227. Id. at 8. 
 228. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 149 n.4 (2006). 
 229. Id. at 148, 149 n.4. 
 230. Id. at 149 n.4. 
 231. Id. 
 232. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2012). 
 233. 560 U.S. 631 (2010). 
 234. See Uhrig, supra note 7, at 1229–45. 
 235. The Supreme Court recently held that a claim of actual innocence may toll 
the statute of limitations Under AEDPA.  See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924 
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Likewise, as discussed in Part I, under the common law and AEDPA, a 
petitioner is required to exhaust any claim he seeks to raise in a federal peti-
tion by presenting the claim to the highest available state court.  If he is fore-
closed from doing so by state procedural rules, and such rules are independ-
ent of federal law and consistently applied in state court, the claim will be 
deemed procedurally defaulted in federal court unless he can demonstrate 
cause and prejudice to excuse the default.  Until Martinez, the Court had nev-
er distinguished between otherwise defaulted constitutional claims in defining 
“cause.”  Likewise, “prejudice” depended only on the effect, rather than the 
nature, of the error at issue on the outcome of the case. 
Lastly, AEDPA’s bar on second or successive petitions also in no way 
depends on the nature of the claim a petitioner seeks to raise.236  Under 
AEDPA, a petitioner may file one federal habeas petition, which must contain 
all claims he wishes the court to consider.237  The circumstances for circum-
venting the ban on second or successive petitions are extremely limited.238  
Specifically, the petitioner must show that the claim he seeks to raise in the 
second subsequent petition relies on a new rule of constitutional law that the 
U.S. Supreme Court has already held to be retroactive to cases on collateral 
review; that the claim turns on newly discovered facts that the petitioner 
could not have identified with due diligence; or actual innocence of the of-
fense of conviction.239  Once again, none of these bases turn on the nature of 
the claim(s) that the petitioner seeks to present in the successive petition. 
In short, neither the law governing substantive consideration of claims 
in federal habeas nor the many procedural doctrines that govern that consid-
eration provide support for the Court’s elevation of right-to-trial-counsel 
claims over all other constitutional errors in Martinez. 
 
(2013).  But actual innocence is not a substantive constitutional claim; rather, it is a 
factual and legal condition that can arise independent of any actual constitutional 
violations.  See Jake Sussman, Unlimited Innocence: Recognizing an “Actual Inno-
cence” Exception to AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 343 (2001). 
 236. See See Uhrig, supra note 7, at 1249–50. 
 237. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A)–(C). 
 238. Id. § 2244(b)(2). 
 239. § 2244(b)(2) provides that the petitioner must show either: 
 
(A) . . . that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroac-
tive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously 
unavailable; or 
(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered pre-
viously through the exercise of due diligence; and 
(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evi-
dence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing ev-
idence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have 
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C.  The Special, Protected Status Martinez Confers on                     
Gideon v. Wainwright Is Unsustainable. 
The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel is undis-
putedly a fundamental one that occupies the core of the criminal process in 
the United States.  After all, defense counsel is charged with defending all 
other constitutional rights that protect the criminally accused.  Where counsel 
is deficient, those rights may go unprotected.  As such, the right to counsel 
permeates every aspect of the criminal process.  As an essential component of 
the adversarial system, constitutionally competent counsel plays a critical role 
in ensuring the integrity of the criminal justice system.  In addition, Gideon’s 
right to counsel is a prerequisite to a constitutionally fair trial, regardless of 
the weight of evidence against the defendant.240  Hence, a petitioner who is 
denied his right to a lawyer at trial is entitled to a new trial even in cases 
where his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt appears to be unassailable.241 
Moreover, Justice Kennedy noted in Martinez that “[w]hen an attorney 
errs in initial-review collateral proceedings” in litigating a substantial ineffec-
tive assistance of trial counsel claim, or when petitioner, himself errs because 
he lacks counsel altogether, “[I]t is likely that no state court at any level will 
hear the prisoner’s claim.”242  The result is a thread of ineffective assistance 
that binds the inmate to his prison cell.  Thus, by excusing the resulting de-
fault in this circumstance, Martinez infuses muscle into the right to effective 
assistance of trial counsel by ensuring the availability of federal habeas cor-
pus to enforce that right.  But the decision leaves unresuscitated other consti-
tutional rights that also protect the integrity of the criminal process but that 
may be defaulted as a result of inadequate assistance of initial-review, post-
conviction counsel. 
Even accepting that the Sixth Amendment’s right to effective assistance 
of trial counsel sits at the helm of the pantheon of constitutional rights that 
protect the criminally accused, Martinez’s elevation of its enforcement above 
the rest of those rights is hard to defend.  After all, what, if anything, is the 
difference in constitutional enforcement value between a Sixth Amendment 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim and for example, a Brady v. Mary-
land/Giglio v. United States claim based on the State’s failure to disclose 
material, exculpatory evidence to the defense?  Martinez turns on equitable 
considerations.243  It is hard to see how the equitable demand for federal court 
review of an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim exceeds the demand 
that applies to other claims of constitutional error substantial enough to sur-
vive Brecht v. Abrahamson’s harmless error analysis.244 
 
 240. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 241. Id. 
 242. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1316 (2012). 
 243. Id. at 1318. 
 244. 507 U.S. 619 (1993). 
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This issue is perhaps best illustrated by example.  Consider the facts of 
Milke v. Ryan,245 which like Martinez, emerged in recent years from the Ari-
zona criminal justice system.246  Debra Milke was convicted in 1990 of mur-
dering her four-year-old son and was sentenced to death.247  The prosecu-
tion’s theory was that Milke had conspired with two others (her roommate, 
Styers, and Styers’s friend, Scott) to commit the murder, which Styers, with 
Scott’s assistance, in turn carried out.  Scott confessed soon after the boy’s 
disappearance and led authorities to the boy’s body.248 
The only evidence at trial connecting Milke to the crime was Phoenix 
Police Detective Saldate’s testimony that Milke had confessed to him during 
an interview soon after the murder.249  Milke, on the other hand, consistently 
denied any involvement in her son’s murder, let alone that she had confessed 
to police.250  Instead, she testified that Detective Saldate ignored her request 
for an attorney at the beginning of his interrogation and then altered her actu-
al statements to render them inculpatory.251 
The State had nothing to corroborate Detective Saldate’s testimony, as 
he had ignored a supervisor’s instruction to record the interrogation, had not 
requested that anyone witness it, and had never procured a signed Miranda 
waiver from Milke.252  Similarly, Saldate could not produce his own inter-
view notes at trial, which he testified he destroyed after preparing the official 
police report three days after Milke’s interrogation.253  The State had no phys-
ical evidence connecting Milke to the crime, and her alleged co-conspirators, 
Styers and Scott, would not testify against her.254  Nonetheless, the jury and 
trial judge credited the detective’s testimony over Milke’s, and she was con-
victed and sentenced to death.255 
Milke sought postconviction relief, alleging inter alia that her due pro-
cess rights were violated under Brady v. Maryland256 and Giglio v. United 
States257 based on the State’s failure to disclose to the defense material excul-
patory evidence, including impeachment evidence, pertaining to Detective 
Saldate.258   Specifically, the State withheld from the defense a treasure trove 
of impeachment evidence that would have cast serious doubt on Detective 
 
 245. See Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 246. See id. at 1001. 
 247. Id. at 1000–02. 
 248. Id. at 1001. 
 249. Id. at 1002. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. at 1003. 
 255. Id. 
 256. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 257. 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
 258. Milke, 711 F.3d at 1006. 
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Saldate’s credibility as a witness.259  This evidence included a prior suspen-
sion for taking “liberties” with a female motorist and then lying about it to 
supervisors; numerous cases in which courts had thrown out confessions or 
indictments because Saldate had lied under oath; and more cases still where 
courts had suppressed confessions or vacated convictions because Saldate had 
violated a suspect’s Fifth or Fourth Amendment rights, “often egregious-
ly,”260 during interrogations.261 
Brady and its progeny provide that the due process clause requires the 
prosecution to disclose to the defense before trial all material exculpatory 
evidence.262  The good faith of the prosecutor is irrelevant.263  In Giglio, the 
Court held Brady includes witness impeachment evidence.264  In both Brady 
and Giglio, the Court observed that withholding material exculpatory evi-
dence violates a defendant’s right to a fair trial.265  Thus, in a lengthy, strong-
ly worded opinion, the Ninth Circuit in Milke granted the writ based in part 
on the substantial Brady and Giglio violations.266 
In Milke, trial counsel’s competency was not at issue: the constitutional 
error that denied Milke her right to a fair trial stemmed from the State’s with-
holding of material, exculpatory evidence.   Postconviction counsel per-
formed with professional competence by effectively excavating the facts un-
derpinning the Brady/Giglio claims and then framing the prosecutor’s failure 
to disclose the evidence at issue as due process violations.  As a result, the 
Great Writ functioned as intended, and Milke received a new trial. 
Now suppose instead that Milke’s postconviction counsel had been less 
than competent, i.e., failed to investigate and raise the Brady/Giglio claims in 
the first postconviction petition filed on her behalf, which state courts then 
denied on the merits.  After the state courts’ denial of relief, Milke is able to 
secure new postconviction counsel, who in turn performs competently, as 
competently as postconviction counsel in the actual case, and effectively rais-
es the Brady/Giglio claims in a second postconviction petition.  But now, due 
to state procedural rules prohibiting second or successive petitions, the state 
courts refuse to consider the merits of the claims and instead simply deny the 
petition as an abuse of the writ.  If Milke were to turn to federal court for 
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, procedural default doctrine would bar merits 
review.  Because the attorney error at issue is postconviction counsel’s, rather 
than trial counsel’s, Martinez, on its face, would provide no procedural relief: 
as written, the only postconviction counsel error that defaults substantial inef-
fective assistance of trial counsel claims provide “cause” to excuse a proce-
 
 259. Id. at 1002–03. 
 260. In one case, Detective Saldate interrogated a suspect “who was strapped to a 
hospital bed, incoherent after apparently suffering a skull fracture.”  Id. at 1004. 
 261. Id. at 1003, 1005. 
 262. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
 263. Id. 
 264. 405 U.S. 150, 153–55 (1972). 
 265. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153–55. 
 266. Milke, 711 F.3d 998. 
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dural default.  Thus, however righteous the claims, Milke would have no 
remedy in federal habeas proceedings.  Her claims would remain unreviewed 
by any court, state or federal.  The State’s conduct, egregious as it was, would 
remain unchecked, and Milke’s conviction and death sentence would remain 
intact. 
Now imagine a second hypothetical scenario under Milke’s facts where 
the State in fact had disclosed the substantial impeachment evidence, as re-
quired by Brady and Giglio.  Due to professional incompetency, however, 
Milke’s trial counsel failed to use the evidence properly during cross-
examination of Detective Saldate.  As a result, the jury was never able to 
consider the impeachment evidence in evaluating Saldate’s testimony.  As 
such, under Martinez, Milke would have a viable, and substantial, ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claim.  As above, again assume Milke’s first post-
conviction counsel performs incompetently and fails to litigate the ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claims.  As a result, state courts deny her first 
round of postconviction petitions on the merits.  Later, with new, competent 
postconviction counsel, Milke presents the ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel claim in state court in a second round of postconviction petitions.  As 
in the first hypothetical, the state courts deny the second round of petitions as 
an abuse of the writ.  Again, Milke turns next to the federal court for issuance 
of the writ.  This time, because postconviction counsel’s error, left unreme-
died, would procedurally default substantial ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel claims, under Martinez the error supplies “cause” to excuse the de-
fault. 
Is the harm in the first hypothetical circumstance to the petitioner any 
different than what occurred in the actual case or what occurs in the second 
hypothetical?  In Milke’s actual case, the harm stemmed from state action 
and, hence, violated the due process clause.  In the first hypothetical, the 
harm derives from both state action and first postconviction counsel’s incom-
petency in failing to investigate and frame in constitutional terms the State’s 
action.  And in the second hypothetical scenario, the harm emerges from both 
trial counsel’s and first postconviction counsel’s incompetency.   The result, 
however, is identical: as a result of constitutional error, the jury is denied 
crucial evidence in evaluating the credibility of the prosecution’s key witness, 
and Milke stands convicted of a capital crime that is in all likelihood unsup-
ported by the evidence.  And yet, under Martinez, if the due process and Sixth 
Amendment claims, respectively, are later procedurally defaulted due to at-
torney error during initial-review postconviction proceedings, only the latter 
Sixth Amendment claims will receive federal review.  It is hard to discern 
how this is equitable. 
Nor is this result consistent with federal habeas corpus doctrine.  The 
historical and modern function of the writ of habeas corpus, even as substan-
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tially hamstrung by AEDPA, has never played constitutional favorites.267  
Rather, as discussed at length in Part III.B., the Great Writ provides the legal 
mechanism by which an individual in custody can challenge the constitution-
ality of his detention in federal court.  Not only is federal habeas corpus cen-
tral to separation of powers doctrine,268 but with rare exception,269 it stands as 
enforcer of the entire panoply of constitutional rights that protect a criminal 
defendant. 
Gideon is not overrated, far from it.  Indeed, many a voice has been ap-
propriately raised in recent years calling for its reinforcement.270  But the 
remaining constitutional rights that protect the criminally accused deserve 
equal footing in their enforcement.  If anything, such other violations are the 
reality, whereas Gideon is the proxy.  Gideon reassures us of the integrity of 
the criminal process.  If a defendant is denied assistance of counsel, we pre-
sume prejudice and that a new trial is warranted, but a substantial, identifiable 
constitutional violation like what occurred in Milke tells us definitively that 
justice has been denied. 
Indeed, the power of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel stems from 
counsel’s crucial role in ensuring enforcement of constitutional rights such as 
due process.  Thus, where a petitioner makes the difficult case of showing 
that due process has in fact been denied to him, it is hard to see how this is 
less worthy of federal review than an ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
claim.  Instead, Martinez’s holding should extend to all substantial claims of 
constitutional error that impact fundamental fairness or the accuracy of the 
 
 267. See Uhrig, supra note 7 (arguing that the inordinate procedural complexity of 
AEDPA denies pro se inmates their constitutionally guaranteed right to access to the 
courts). 
 268. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (invalidating section 7 of the 
Military Commissions Act of 2006, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) under the Suspension Clause 
for its attempt to strip the writ of habeas corpus from alien detainees at Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba). 
 269. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (finding Fourth Amendment viola-
tions to be uncognizable in federal habeas unless the petitioner was denied either his 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel at trial or the opportunity to assert the violation in 
state court). 
 270. See, e.g., Note, Effectively Ineffective: The Failure of Courts to Address 
Underfunded Indigent Defense Systems, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1731–32 (2005); 
Note, Gideon’s Promise Unfulfilled: The Need for Litigated Reform of Indigent De-
fense, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2062 (2000); Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No 
Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of 
Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625 (1986); Note, The Paper Tiger of Gideon v. 
Wainwright and the Evisceration of the Right to Appointment of Legal Counsel for 
Indigent Defendants, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 495, 540 (2005); E.E. 
Edwards, Getting Around Gideon: The Illusion of Effective Assistance of Counsel, 
THE CHAMPION (Jan./Feb. 2004). 
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guilt/innocence determination.271  Equitable relief should not be obtained 
merely for those claims that involve allegations of ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel.  Where inadequate assistance of initial-review, postconviction 
counsel causes an inmate to default in federal habeas corpus proceedings such 
a substantial272 claim of constitutional error, equitable relief should apply.  
The universe of claims that should excuse a procedural default necessarily 
includes allegations of a substantial denial of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments’ Due Process Clause guarantees of fundamental fairness;273 the 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination274 and the Double 
Jeopardy Clause;275 the Sixth Amendment’s trial-related rights, including, as 
recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court, the right to present a defense;276 and 
the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment.277  
 
 271. See David McCord, Visions of Habeas, 1994 BYU L. REV. 735, 757–59 
(1994); Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 579, 589–92 (Winter 1982). 
 272. “Substantial,” in turn, should be defined consistent with Brecht v. Abraham-
son’s harmless error doctrine.  See 507 U.S. 619, 622 (1993).  In that way, we can 
achieve synchronicity between this new, equitable right to counsel doctrine and the 
role of the Great Writ of Liberty.  See id. 
 273. U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that no person shall be “deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (no State 
shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”).  
See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (Due Process Clause requires states 
to disclose to criminal defendants material, exculpatory evidence relevant to guilt or 
punishment); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (Due Process Clause prohib-
its use in evidence of involuntary confessions). 
 274. U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that no person “shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself”).  See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436 (1966) (privilege against self-incrimination requires police, before subjecting a 
person to custodial interrogation, to advise of right to remain silent and consequences 
of waiving that right and right to assistance of counsel during such interrogation). 
 275. U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that no person shall “be subject for the 
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb”).  See North Carolina v. 
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (holding Double Jeopardy Clause applies to both succes-
sive punishment and successive prosecution for the same criminal offense). 
 276. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall en-
joy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed; . . . and to be informed of the nature 
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of 
counsel for his defence.”).  See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (Sixth 
Amendment constitutionalizes the right in an adversarial criminal trial to present a 
defense); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (Confrontation Clause re-
quires criminal defendant have opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses who 
offer testimonial evidence against him). 
 277. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibiting “cruel and unusual punishment”).  See 
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (applying Eighth Amendment to 
states via the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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Constitutionally competent counsel may play a critical role in assuring us of 
the integrity of the criminal justice system.  But it has good company in the 
balance of rights enshrined in criminal procedure that guarantee fundamental 
fairness and the accuracy of the criminal process. 
CONCLUSION 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s recognition of an “equitable” right to assis-
tance of postconviction counsel in litigating substantial ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel claims offers a practical solution to the infinite continuum of 
habeas dilemma.  But the Court’s limitation of this right to cases in which a 
petitioner seeks to raise an otherwise-defaulted, substantial ineffective assis-
tance of trial counsel claim in initial review collateral proceedings is unsus-
tainable.  The elevation in postconviction enforcement of claims derived from 
Gideon v. Wainwright over all other substantial claims of constitutional error 
finds no support in the history and function of the Great Writ.  Rather, if equi-
ty demands a remedy where postconviction counsel fails to raise a Sixth 
Amendment ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, and thus defaults the 
claim in federal court, it should likewise demand a remedy where counsel 
fails to argue any other substantial constitutional violation that compromises 
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